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Abstract 
In Europe, accounting standards prevent larger expenditures on employer-
sponsored training from being treated as investments. Using Sweden as 
example, we discuss two consequences for training. 
    First, the timing: training will be conducted when income is large enough for 
training costs to be deducted without loss. This is more often possible during 
booms than recessions, providing a stabilisation policy dimension to training. 
    Second, the volume: the training opportunity cost (foregone production) is 
largest during booms. Hence, training tends to be smaller than if conducted 
during downturns, possibly limiting growth. 
    We formulate two proposals that can make training more counter-cyclical 
and increase the amount of training. 
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IFAU – Employer-sponsored training in stabilisation and growth policy perspectives  2 1 Introduction 
The discussion in this paper lies on the borderline between economics and 
business administration. It is motivated by an institutional characteristic, 
namely the norms and standards determining how firms’ training expenditures 
are treated in the accounting system. This is a business administration consider-
ation. Our interest in this institutional characteristic stems from the fact that it 
is most likely to affect both the timing and the volume of employer-sponsored 
training, i.e. training that is partly or wholly paid for by the employer. These 
effects are aspects of economics, via their connections to stabilisation and 
growth policy issues. 
Stern and Ritzen (1991) and Booth and Snower (1996) consider various 
market failures in training, implying that the amount of training conducted is 
smaller than the socially optimal amount. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a,b) 
extend that discussion and, more importantly, develop a framework explaining 
why employers pay for both general and firm-specific training, not just for 
firm-specific training as argued by  Becker (1964). That employers do indeed 
pay for both kinds of training has been empirically documented by, e.g., Barron 
et al. (1997) and Leuven and Oosterbeek (1999). Obviously, to the extent that 
the accounting system constitutes a constraint on employer-sponsored training, 
affecting this constraint can increase the amount of training provided. And, we 
will argue, it can also affect the allocation of training over the business cycle. 
While we focus on Sweden, the discussion in many respects applies to 
Europe in general; accounting standards are similar in many other European 
countries, because of harmonisation through international standards. Indeed, to 
the extent that accounting standards do affect employer-sponsored training in 
Sweden our discussion should be most relevant for other European countries 
because, according to the Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS2) 
conducted by the EU, the incidence of employer-sponsored training is lower in 
other European countries than in Sweden, Denmark being the only exception. 
Why, then, should accounting standards be a problem? The problem is that 
although the effects of the training in many cases extend over several years, the 
firm has to take up the entire expenditure as a cost directly, during the same 
year that the training is carried out. And these expenditures can often be quite 
large, covering instructional material, facilities, teachers, and, not least, wages 
for stand-ins for the employees in training. 
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the treatment of real capital expenditures, i.e. equipment and buildings, in the 
accounting system. As a rule, expenditures on real capital can be entered as 
assets on the balance sheet. Put differently, they can be treated as investments. 
This has several implications. Most importantly, the total cost needs not be 
written off immediately; it can be divided across several years as depreciations. 
As a consequence, also larger investments can be made during a year with 
relatively low income without inflicting a loss on the firm, because only a 
portion of the cost directly affects income negatively.
  The spending 
opportunities are thus not as limited as they would have been if the total 
investment had to be written off during the year of the investment.
 Moreover, 
the fact that costs are divided over several years leads to less variation over 
time in the firm’s reported results. 
Human capital expenditures, by contrast, are not considered valid balance 
sheet items. This means that the entire expenditure affects the result during the 
year in which the expenditure is made. Thus, when it comes to larger training 
expenditures, companies will have to wait for years with good income, so that 
the costs can be deducted without risk of loss. Good years generally fall into 
boom periods. The fact that human capital investments cannot be entered on 
the balance sheet thus tends to make them pro-cyclical. The timing of the cycle 
may, of course, vary somewhat across industries, and even firms. Still, firm 
training will aggravate the swings in employment over the (average) business 
cycle of the economy through this mechanism, instead of dampening the 
fluctuations, as would have been the case, had the training been conducted 
during economic downturns. 
During boom periods the cost for training in terms of foregone production – 
the opportunity cost of training – is at its highest. This will have a restraining 
effect on the volume of firm training. Accordingly, the fact that training 
expenditures cannot be entered on the balance sheet will also tend to decrease 
the amount of training, because of the high opportunity costs, ceteris paribus. 
And when companies do carry out training during recessions, they are most 
likely to restrict themselves to smaller training programs, because the income 
against which the training cost is written off is lower. 
The effects on the timing and the volume of firm training are strengthened 
by a cash-flow constraint: unlike investments in real capital, training invest-
ments do no create their own collateral (Piore, 1968). Accordingly, the firm 
will have to finance its training expenditures by internally generated cash, 
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during downturns. Due to the cash-flow constraint, firms will generally have 
very limited possibilities to make use of the fact that the opportunity cost of 
training is relatively low during recessions.  
The company tax system also affects firm training. It will be shown in the 
next section that there are opportunities within the tax system to mitigate the 
effects caused by the accounting standards.  
What makes the problems that we have pointed to quite important, from a 
practical point of view, is the fact that employer-sponsored training is certainly 
not a negligible phenomenon. In Sweden, employer-sponsored training is the 
type of adult education that currently reaches the most people. During the first 
half of 2001, two million individuals participated in some kind of employer-
sponsored training (Statistics Sweden, 2001a). Komvux, a state-sponsored 
educational program aimed at providing older, low-educated, workers with 
qualifications corresponding to upper secondary school, is the country’s second 
largest adult education operation in terms of number of participants. Komvux 
served only about one-tenth as many people as those engaged in firm training, 
however. (Statistics Sweden, 2000).  
Figure 1 illustrates the stabilisation and growth aspects of firm training that 
we described. 
Figure 1: A stylised picture of the variation in a firm's training















































The top-most curve illustrates how capacity usage varies over the business 
cycle. The middle curve illustrates a counter-cyclical time profile for training, 
i.e. it is most encompassing when the business cycle hits bottom, and then 
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reaches its peak. The bottom curve is drawn so as to illustrate that the business-
cycle variation of actual training is not very large, but when existing, the 
variation is pro-cyclical, i.e. training expenditures are largest during booms and 
smallest during recessions. In the figure we have also taken into account that 
the actual training volume tends to be lower than it would have been under 
different institutional conditions. This is indicated by the positioning of the 
actual training profile below the counter-cyclical training profile. 
We do not think that employers act irrationally; they adapt to institutional 
conditions that restrict their activities.  Therefore, this paper has a normative 
aim, too; we suggest changes in the institutional conditions that we believe 
should have positive effects on training.      
We believe that training is an example of an instance in which two effects 
can be reached with one and the same measure. The changes we propose are 
likely to affect training in a positive direction both from a stabilisation policy 
perspective (by making training more counter-cyclical) and from a growth 
policy perspective (by increasing training volume).  
The paper unfolds as follows. In section 2 we take a closer look at the 
accounting and tax aspects of firm training. Sections 3 and 4 provide empirical 
support for our claims about the timing and the volume of training. Section 5 
discusses two proposals for shifting training toward recession periods and 
increasing the amount of training. One proposal focuses on the accounting 
standards, the other on the company tax system. In the final section we 
summarise our results and argue in favour of one of our proposals, the one 
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training 
When considering accounting regulations, it’s important to make a distinction 
between the legislation itself and how the laws are applied.
1 According to 
Sweden’s Annual Accounts Act (AAA), companies’ annual reports must be 
based on good accounting practices,
 which constitute a legal standard founded 
on accounting laws, the preparatory documents underlying these laws, and on 
the accounting standards.
2 Companies are thus required to follow both the 
accounting legislation and the accounting standards. 
The formation of accounting standards to a large extent takes place through 
general advice and recommendations from standard-setting organisations. In 
Sweden, there are both private standard-setting organizations, such as Swedish 
Financial Accounting Standards Council, and public organizations, like the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB). Similar arrangements exist in other 
European countries. The recommendations provided by domestic standard-
setting organisations are, in turn, greatly influenced by the work of the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).
3  
In the following subsections we first consider the Annual Accounts Act 
statements about training, then the corresponding accounting standards, and, 
finally, tax-related issues. 
 
2.1  The Annual Accounts Act (AAA) 
The relevant legislation here is that which affects fixed assets, i.e., assets that 
are permanently used or contained within an operation. Chapter 4, paragraph 2 
of the AAA states: 
“Expenditures for R&D and similar work that is of considerable value for 
the operation during years to come may be reported as intangible fixed 
assets.” 
                                                      
1 Our review of legislation and standard setting focuses on requirements for corporations.  Here, 
the word company means corporation. To the best of our knowledge, differences do not exist 
with respect to the treatment of training expenditures in other forms of association. 
2 Annual Accounts Act (1995:1554), chapter 4, paragraph 1. 
3 Previously the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). See www.iasb.org.uk 
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preparatory documents of the AAA. Further, in a review of the AAA, the AAA 
committee interpreted the paragraph as follows:
4 
“Any hindrances (formally or in practice) from treating this type of 
expenditure in a similar way (i.e. as expenditures for R&D, our 
comment) do not exist. The AAA and Accounting Standards Act, which 
allow expenditure capitalisation – not just for R&D but for similar work 
– support such treatment.” 
Accordingly, the AAA does not specify limitations regarding companies’ 
opportunities to capitalise costs for training. 
The AAA committee also pointed out that valuations on income statements 
and balance sheets must be reported with reasonable care (the prudence 
principle) and that only revenues and costs relevant to the financial year should 
be reported, regardless of the time of payment (the accruals principle). 
According to the committee, companies may not go overboard when it comes 
to precautionary measures by booking expenditures that enable financial 
benefits in periods that follow. Adapted to training expenditures, this means 
that the entire training expenditure should be taken up as a cost during the same 
year that the training occurred only if the financial effects from the training are 
confined to that year.   
We can thus conclude that the accounting legislation allows capitalisation of 
training expenditures and even prescribes that this opportunity should be used, 
if the effect of the expenditure spans several years. As we shall see, the 
problem lies in the accounting standards, rather than in the accounting legis-
lation. 
 
2.2 Accounting  standards 
The accounting standards are based on interpretations of the criteria that define 
what is meant by an asset, i.e. an item that can be entered on the balance sheet. 
An asset must fulfil three criteria: 1) it must be identifiable, 2) the company 
must control the asset as a result of events and transactions, and 3) the asset 
                                                      
4 SOU 1996:157, Översyn av redovisningslagstiftningen – Slutbetänkande från Redovisnings-
kommittén. (Review of the Annual Accounts Act – Final Report from the Annual Accounts 
Committee) 
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 5  In 
addition to these criteria, expenditures for the asset must be measurable in a 
reliable way. 
The asset is considered identifiable if it can be separated. This means that 
the company can rent, sell, exchange, or distribute income or financial benefits 
that are linked to the asset without losing any future financial benefits that are 
generated by other assets in the operation. When controlling an asset, the 
company can enjoy financial benefits generated by that asset and simulta-
neously prevent others from enjoying these benefits. This quote from Swedish 
Financial Accounting Standards Council illustrates that the control criterion 
was a given far-reaching interpretation in the standards developed for training 
expenditures: 
“… a company with skilled personnel often considers increased 
knowledge via training as a source of future financial benefits … but in 
general a company can not control how long employees (including 
executives) remain with the company. So normally, the asset-control 
criterion can not be fulfilled…”  
This statement agrees with the general practice that historically has specified 
companies’ opportunities to capitalise training expenditures.  So in reality, 
companies have had limited opportunities to capitalise training expenditures – 
despite the committee’s intentions in its review of the Annual Accounts Act.
6 
Strangely enough, the discrepancy between the accounting legislation and 
its implementation increases – rather than decreases – over time. As of 
1  January 2002, the following recommendation from the Swedish Financial 
Accounting Standards Council applies: 
                                                      
5 See, for example, Belkaoui (1992). 
6 It’s interesting to compare the requirements that allow training expenditures to be entered on 
the balance sheet with comparable requirements for tangible assets, i.e. real capital. The 
Financial Accounting Standards Council recommendation 12, issued in December 1999, item 4, 
states: “A tangible asset must (our italics) be reported as a balance sheet asset when: 
   - on the basis of available information, future financial benefits that are linked to possession of 
     the asset ere likely to be advantageous for the company, 
and  
   - the purchase value for the asset can be calculated in a reliable way.” 
These requirements are considerably weaker than those that must be fulfilled if training 
expenditures are to be activated on the balance sheet. 
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expenditures are incurred. According to the recommendation, other 
examples of expenditures that must be reported as costs when incurred 
are expenditures for … training … ” 
7 
Formally, this means a further tightening of previous recommendations.  In 
reality, it will not have a significant effect on companies’ accounting practices, 




2.3  The tax system 
In its review of the AAA, the AAA committee stated that company tax rules 
work against opportunities to capitalise training expenditures, as specified in 
the AAA.
9 The committee argued that by taking up training as a cost, 
companies can directly receive the entire tax reduction. If, instead, training 
expenditures were capitalised, only a smaller proportion of the tax deduction 
would benefit the company immediately; the major proportion of the benefits 
would accrue in future periods.  Because companies can expect to have a 
positive time preference for money, i.e. they value money today higher than 
money in the future, this makes the direct write-off more advantageous. 
However, the committee’s reasoning apparently builds on the implicit 
assumption that time preference for money is the only relevant issue in this 
situation. For example, the committee’s argument assumes that the company 
will always be able to choose if it wants to immediately write off or capitalise 
the training expenditures.
  This need not be the case for larger training 
expenditures; during recession years, income can be so small that larger 
training expenditures would lead to loss if they were to be written off 
immediately which, in turn, would mean that the company could not use the 
entire tax discount.  The committee’s interpretation also disregards that fact 
that the opportunity cost of training can vary over time. If the company, by 
capitalising training expenditures, could carry out the training during a 
recession rather than a boom, then the negative effect that could occur – due to 
                                                      
7 Financial Accounting Standards Council recommendation 15 Intangible Assets, August 2000, 
“Introduction”, item 6. 
8 The future of this recommendation is somewhat uncertain. The underlying international 
recommendation – IAS 38, Intangible Assets (IASB, 1998) is expected to change; most likely, 
this will also lead to changes in Sweden’s standards for intangible asset accounting. 
9  SOU 1996:157, page 426-27. 
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more than balanced by the lower opportunity cost.  
These objections make it difficult to believe that tax legislation is the 
primary reason why companies don’t capitalise their training expenditures. 
Instead, we believe that it is the accounting standards described in the previous 
subsection that have prevented companies from capitalising these expenditures. 
It’s interesting to note that within the tax legislation framework, an 
opportunity exists for mitigating the effects of the accounting standards.  Since 
the 1995 fiscal year, companies have had the possibility to use tax allocation 
funds,
 whose purpose is to give companies opportunities to spread income over 
time by transferring portions of the income from good years to years with less 
income.
10 Companies can each year reserve up to 25 percent of their net 
income before taxes in the funds. The reserves must be brought back into the 
books within six years after they were set aside.   
It is probable, however, that the tax allocation funds only to a limited extent 
have been used for training purposes, because of the relatively high risks that 
are perceived to be associated with training expenditures.
11 As companies can 
select the way in which they will use the extra spending opportunities that the 
funds create, the companies will prioritise projects with low risk, all else equal. 
Training expenditures are then likely to be given rather low priority.
12 
                                                      
10 Similar systems have existed earlier, e.g., tax equalisation reserves. Comparable constructions 
can also be found in other European countries. 
11 These risks are of two kinds. The first type is similar to the risk facing companies making 
R&D investments, i.e. that it is highly likely that the endeavour may prove unsuccessful. The 
second risk, which is specific to training, is that companies cannot be sure that they will receive 
the returns even on successful training programs because there is always a risk that those who 
have undergone training will leave the company. The fact that the companies cannot insure 
themselves against these two kinds of risk leads to market failures in training; see, e.g., Stern and 
Ritzen (1991) and Booth and Snower (1996). 
12 Of course, a high risk can be weighed against a high expected return. But the available 
information on the return to training expenditures is mixed. For Sweden, a study of compara-
tively large Swedish companies suggested that the returns can be very high (Kazamaki Ottersten 
et al., 1999), while preliminary results from a study of small firms points toward very weak 
effects (Bager-Sjögren and Gustafsson, 2001). Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge there 
exists no information on to what extent the tax allocation funds are used for training purposes. 
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cycle  
We will now examine whether the actual time profile of firm training really 
tends to be pro-cyclical, as indicated in Figure 1. Analyses of how training 
varies over the business cycle require special data.  We need data on training 
and business cycle situations that apply to the same companies. Such data are 
unavailable in official statistics.
13 However, a survey administered by the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise and the Research Institute of Industrial 
Economics (IUI), the Plan survey, contains such information. The Plan survey 
is a rotating panel survey covering large firms or, more correctly, large 
workplaces in the Swedish manufacturing sector. More than 90 percent of the 
firms covered in Plan survey have at least 100 employees.
14  
    Using the Plan survey data, we can shed light on training’s business-cycle 
variation in two different ways. 
 
1.  On two occasions (1997 and 2001), the companies were asked about 
whether they thought that, historically, their training expenditures had 
been related to two business-cycle indicators: capacity usage and profit 
level. The responses provide a general picture of the degree to which 
training is pro-cyclical, counter-cyclical, or independent of the business 
cycle. But the information is relatively weak because it is based on the 
companies’ perceptions of their actions, rather than on their actual 
behaviours. 
 
2.  For the years 1996 and 2000 there are data on the companies’ training 
expenditures, capacity usage, and profits. These data are of great interest 
by themselves; in addition, they give us an opportunity to study whether 
the companies’ responses to the retrospective questions in 1. agree with 
their actual behaviours. Specifically, if responses to the retrospective 
questions indicate that the historical variation of training has been pro-
cyclical, then there should be a positive relationship between actual 
                                                      
13 Statistics Sweden provides individual-level training data and aggregate business-cycle 
indicators such as capacity usage in the manufacturing sector.   
14 See Mellander and Savvidou (2001) for information about the Plan survey’s structure and 
representativeness.  
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companies in the previous year. We can thus check the collective result of 
the companies’ perceptions about their actions over a longer period by 
comparing these perceptions with variation between companies’ actual 
behaviours at a specific point in time. What we do is that we exploit the 
fact that the (average) business cycle for the whole economy is made up of 
firm-specific cycles. In principle, every firm faces its own business cycle 
and the cycles of different firm will depart somewhat from one another. 
Thus, even though our data pertain to a fixed point in time, we get 
observations on training relating to different phases of the business cycle. 
Of course, some of this variation will be due to heterogeneity across firms. 
Therefore, at the end of this section, we will also control for several firm-
specific factors, to focus on differences between firms stemming from 
exogenous shocks, such as local variations in labour supply and product 
demand. 
 
Before proceeding, we should say a few words about the definition of the 
training expenditures. The companies were asked state their expenditures on 
training, carried out either by the company itself or financed by the firm (but 
conducted by someone else). The sums stated can safely be taken to include 
direct expenditures – salaries for instructors, rents, teaching materials, and 
wages for stand-ins for those participating in the training. However, costs of 
foregone production are, in general, not included.
15 Accordingly, the training 
expenditures recorded are generally downward biased. 
In principle, inclusion of costs for foregone production should be preferable 
from an economic point of view, in the sense that it gives a better account of 
the resources that have to be sacrificed to conduct the training. This 
presupposes, however, that companies are capable of providing good estimates 
of the cost of foregone production. In general, this presupposition is not 
justified; costs of foregone production are commonly estimated to be equal to 
hourly wage costs times the number of hours in training. While this will be a 
                                                      
15 The reason why we know this is that on two occasion, 1996 and 2002, the companies in the 
Plan survey have been asked directly whether they include costs of foregone production in the 
training expenditures they report. On both occasions about 80 percent responded that they did 
include costs of foregone production. 
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the cost when the firm does not make full use of its workers.  
In the present context, there is also an argument to be made for excluding 
costs of foregone production. The reason is that we want to examine whether 
accounting standards constrain firm training. And accounting standards can 
only constrain training expenditures that result in payments, which costs of 
foregone production do not. 
We start by studying relationships between training and capacity usage. 
Figure 2 shows how in 1997 and 2001, companies regarded this relationship 
from a historical perspective. For both years, the response given by the least 
number of companies is the response that indicates a negative relationship, i.e. 
that training variation was counter-cyclical.  
 Figure 2. "How have training expenditures varied historically with
                  the company's capacity usage?" Larger industrial 





















Both in 1997 and 2001, most companies selected the  “no relationship” answer 
option.  Nevertheless, for both years Figure 2 gives the impression that the 
business cycle does not seem to affect training especially much, but if a 
correlation exists, it seems to be positive, indicating a pro-cyclical relationship. 
The difference between the positive and negative answers is not statistically 
significant, however. 
The impression from Figure 2 agrees well with how the relation between 
actual training and capacity utilisation varied between companies in 1996 and 
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measured in relation to total wage costs, in percent. By measuring training in 
this way, we account for the obvious fact that training expenditures should be 
larger, in nominal terms, in large firms than in small firms. Capacity utilisation 
is specified on the horizontal axes and is defined as the proportion of used  
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Figure 3a. Training expenditures relative to total wage costs, in %, 
by capacity usage (stratified),
larger industrial companies, 1996
Source: Plan survey 1997 
n=1                n=12                 n=81                n=47                n=46                n=24 
capacity of maximum capacity, in percent. Capacity utilisation is specified in 
intervals. The distributions of training expenditures are reported for each 
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16 The number of firms observed in each 
capacity interval is given at the top of the figure. 
Figure 3a, which covers 1996, indicates a positive relation between training 
expenditures and capacity utilisation. The median values in the boxes increase 
with the degree of capacity usage and as we move to the right in the diagram, 
the boxes (encompassing 50 percent of the observations in each class) also 
move upward.
17 
In Figure 3b, the positive correlation is weaker.  The median values increase 
with the degree of capacity utilisation but not monotonously; a similar effect 
occurs for the box movements. It could be that the less clear-cut pattern in 
Figure 3b is due to the difference in the definition of training expenditures in 
2000, as opposed to 1996; cf. above. As argued there, the definition of training 
expenditures used for the year 2000 will in general have the effect of over-











                                                      
16 The box plots are constructed as follows. The horizontal line inside the box represents the 
median.  The boxes encompass observations that lie between the 25
th and 75
th percentiles. The 
line that extends up from the box has as its upper limit the largest observation that fulfils the 
criterion for lying, at most, 1.5 times the “box distance” from the box’s top edge. The line that 
extends down is defined in a corresponding way. Possible observations outside these 
demarcations are plotted as separate points. 
17 The same pattern can be verified by means of regression analysis; regressing training costs 
over wage costs on dummy variables indicating the capacity intervals we obtain monotonously 
increasing point estimates. The estimate for the topmost interval is significantly larger than the 
other estimates. 
18 To check if our results are sensitive to the choice of measure of capacity utilisation, we also 
constructed diagrams similar to Figures 3a and 3b, but where capacity usage is measured in 
terms of the proportion of the workforce that the company could do without while still 
maintaining the same level of production. The resulting pattern differ slightly from those 
observed in Figures 3a and 3b, but the conclusion remains: training costs in relation to wage 
costs are higher when companies have less workforce reduction capability, i.e. when their 
capacity usage is higher. These diagrams are not included but are available upon request.   
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  Figure 3b. Training expenditures relative to total wage in %,
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We now look at the relationship between companies training and profits. 
Figure 4 shows what the companies think the relationship between training and 
profits has been historically. In both 1997 and 2001, a clear majority of the 
companies said that training and profit levels were not related to each other. 
But because the proportion of companies that claimed the relationship to be 
negative was totally negligible in both years, a considerable proportion of 
companies still said that the correlation between training and profit levels is 
positive – 26 percent in 1997 and 29 percent in 2001. 
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                  with company profits?" Larger industrial companies, 























Also in this case, the companies’ responses to the retrospective questions agree 
with their actual behaviour the year before. In Figures 5a-b training 
expenditures are measured relative to total wage costs on the vertical axes, in 
percent. Gross profit in relation to total costs is measured on the horizontal 
axes, in percent.
19 Each point in the diagrams represents one company. The 
solid lines are regression lines showing the linear relationship between the two 
variables.  Both regression lines show a positive, albeit insignificant, trend, 








                                                      
19  We define gross profit as: gross profit = total invoicing – total costs, which should correspond 
to the company’s operating income before financial items. 
20 From visual inspection of the diagrams it might look as if quite a few observations lie on the 
horizontal axis, indicating that no training at all is conducted. However, this is an optical illusion. 
In the 1996 sample there is only one observation with zero training and in the 2000 sample there 
are eight. Deletion of the zero observations has very small effect on the slope of the trends. In 
fact, the trends are barely affected even if all observations are deleted for which training makes 
up less than 0,5 percent of total salary costs. 




Figure 5a. Training expenditures relative to total wage costs in%, by gross profits
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Source: Plan survey 1997
Figure 5b. Training expenditures relative to total wage costs in %, by gross
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Source: Plan survey 2001
 
IFAU – Employer-sponsored training in stabilisation and growth policy perspectives   19 One thing to note about Figures 5a-b is that there are several observations 
for which training costs are positive in spite of gross profits being negative. 
Our theoretical arguments in the previous section seems to imply that we 
should expect positive training expenditures only if gross profits are positive, 
too. 
There are (at least) two explanations to the apparent anomalies in Figure 5a-
b.  A partial explanation is that in the diagrams gross profits are defined net of 
training expenditures, rather than before deductions for training expenditures, 
which would have been more in line with our discussion. A more important 
explanation is that our theoretical arguments concern expected profits, whereas 
the diagram show realized profits. The observations with negative profits and 
positive training expenditures may thus correspond to companies that, e.g., 
have experienced negative shocks to demand, making revenues smaller than 
expected.  
In addition to these considerations it is important to emphasize that Figures 
5a-b merely correspond to simple bivariate correlations. Controlling for some 
relevant firm-specific characteristics would be much desirable. As a first step in 
that direction, we have run regressions where training expenditures are 
regressed on gross profits
21, controlling for, i.a., investments in real capital, 
firm size and industry. Investments in real capital are included as they can 
either crowd out training or be in a complementary relation to training. Firm 
size is an obvious control variable as we know that training is more common 
and more extensive in larger firms than in smaller ones; see, e.g., Leuven and 
Oosterbeek (1999). Further, training varies across industries, making it 
necessary to control for the industry the firm belongs to. 
Regarding other control variables, we noticed in Section 2 that the firm’s 
(lack of) cash flow can be an important restriction on its training expenditures. 
Unfortunately, the Plan survey provides no information about the firm’s cash 
flow. However, cash flow should be positively correlated with gross profits. 
The impact of cash flow on training expenditures will thus be partly captured 
by the coefficient for gross profits.
22  
                                                      
21 In the regressions, gross profits are defined before deductions for training expenditures, 
following the above discussion. Besides making more clear the interpretation of the gross profit 
variable as an indicator of the scope for training expenditures, this should decrease the risk for 
simultaneity bias in the gross profit coefficient. 
22 This is a standard case of omitted variable bias; see, e.g., Greene (1993, p. 246-247). Here, this 
bias will have the effect of over-estimating the effect of gross profits on training expenditures. 
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important determinants of the company’s training, namely the occupations and 
the (formal) education of the employees. Specifically, for 1996 we know the 
distributions over skilled white-collar workers, skilled blue-collar works and 
unskilled workers. For the year 2000, we have information on how the firm’s 
employees are distributed over educational levels; elementary, upper-secondary 
and post-secondary. 
To avoid negative estimated training expenditures we have specified the 
regressions to be log-linear. As is well-known, this also has the added 
advantage that the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. 
From a statistical point of view, there is a potential problem with using 
ordinary least squares (OLS), as we do here, since it means that only 
companies with positive training expenditures are included in the regression. 
This will bias our estimates to the extent that there is a fundamental difference 
between companies with zero training expenditures, on the one hand, and very 
small training expenditures, on the other hand. In the present context there are 
no a priori grounds for this to be the case. Moreover, as noted in footnote 20 
the number of observations with zero training expenditure is very small. Never-
theless, as a simple check on whether these observations matter for the results 
we have estimated the regressions in levels (rather than logs) with and without 
the observations with zero training costs. This turns out to have negligible 
effects on the results.
23   
 A similar issue concerns the explanatory variable of primary interest, i.e. 
the gross profit variable. Gross profits can be zero or negative, in which case 
the log of gross profits is not defined. As a result, companies that have zero or 
negative profits but nevertheless positive training expenditures will not be 
included in the estimation of the log-linear regressions. Even when gross 
profits are defined before training expenditures there are 21 such observations 
in the 1996 sample, out of a total of 171 observations, and in the 2000 sample 
we find 6 out 100. If these observations are manifestations of cases where 
negative shocks have resulted in realized profits being (considerably) lower 
than the expected profits that we are interested in, as we conjectured above, 
then it does not seem unnatural to disregard them. However, it is still important 
to try to establish whether doing so matters for the results. Below, we will 
therefore briefly report on a sensitivity analysis of this issue.  
                                                      
23 These results are available on request. 
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only the explanatory variables that are available for the year 2000 as well. The 
coefficient for the gross profit variable is positive, as expected, and significant 
at the 1 percent level. The estimated coefficient indicates that 1 percent 
increase in gross profits will increase training expenditures by 0.19 percent. 
Investments in real capital also have a strongly significant effect on training 
expenditures. The coefficient is positive, indicating a complementary relation 
between real capital investments and company training. This seems quite 
natural – training is often required in connection with real capital investments 
in order to enable efficient use of the new equipment. 
As expected, the number of employees has a positive and very significant 
effect on training expenditures. The magnitude of the effects is very similar to 
the impact from real capital investments; in both cases increases of 1 percent 
increase results in approximately 0.3 percent increases in training expenditures. 
The five industry-specific intercepts are significant at the 1 percent level, too.
24 
The regression explains more than two thirds (68 percent) of the variation in 
training expenditures, indicating that the simple model performs quite well. 
When including the shares of skilled blue-collar workers and skilled white-
collar workers [regression (2)] we find that the latter has a significant positive 
effect on training, compared to the reference category, i.e. unskilled workers. 
The effect of the share of skilled blue-collar workers is not significantly 
different from the share of unskilled workers, however. These results are in line 
with the previous empirical findings showing that skilled personnel, especially 
white-collar workers, get more training than unskilled workers; see, e.g., 
Leuven and Oosterbeek (1999). Furthermore, it is reassuring that including 
information about the firm’s occupational structure has a negligible effect on 









                                                      
24 The industry dummies are based on the five industry categories defined in the Plan survey. 
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Table 1a: Regression of training expenditures on gross profits,  


















Dependent variable: ln training expenditures  
  (1)  (2) 
Explanatory variables  Est.  Std .err.  Est.  Std .err. 
ln gross profits
a   0.190***  0.067   0.202***  0.070 
ln real capital investments   0.290***  0.067   0.264***  0.074 
ln  #  employees   0.319***  0.113   0.346***  0.001 
ln share of skilled blue-collar   -  - -0.005  0.104 
ln share of skilled white-collar   -  -   0.228**  0.103 
Industry dummies:       
    Raw materials  -2.869***  0.554 -2.418***  0.615 
    Construction materials  -3.176***  0.560 -2.792***  0.608 
    Intermediate goods  -3.163***  0.515 -2.802***  0.553 
    Investment goods  -2.821***  0.534 -2.53.3***  0.575 
    Consumption goods  -3.153***  0.546 -2.720***  0.597 
  R2: 0.68   R2:  0.69   
  n=150   n=130   
a Gross profits = total invoicing – total costs, net of training. 
Training expenditures, gross profits and real capital investments are all in millions of SEK. 
*, **, and *** denote significant at 10, 5, and 1 %  respectively. 
    
Table 1b shows the results for 2000.  In the first regression, the gross profit 
variable is significant at the 1 percent level and similar in magnitude to the 
1996 coefficient. The estimated coefficients for the firms’ real capital invest-
ments and number of employees are also positive and significant. Compared to 
the corresponding estimates for 1996 the magnitudes of the point estimates are 
different, however. In particular, the coefficient for the # of employees is 
considerably larger than in the 1996 sample. However, the confidence intervals 
for the 1996 and 2000 estimates overlap, indicating that the difference in the 
point estimates is not statistically significant.  
Like in 1996, all the industry dummies are strongly significant. The 
goodness of fit is even better than in 1996; the model explains more than 80 
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partly due to the number of observations being smaller in 2000, because of a 
lower response rate in 2000 than 1996. 
In the second regression, where information on the share of workers with 
upper-secondary and post-secondary education is included, the number of 
observations is smaller still, as these variables have many missing values. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the additional variables do not have significant impacts 
on training expenditures. As noted above, previous research suggests that large 
shares of skilled/educated workers are often associated with large training 
expenditures. Also, the estimated effects of gross profits, real capital invest-
ments and # employees changes quite a bit when the educational variables are 
included. With respect to real capital investments the change is significant, too.  
It’s hard to judge whether the changes are due to multicollinearity problems or 
to the reduction in the number of observations. Due to these considerations, it 
does not seem justified to attach too much importance to this regression.  
   
Table 1b: Regression of training expenditures on gross profits,  
                controlling for firm characteristics, 2000 
 
Dependent variable: ln training expenditures 
  (1)  (2) 
Explanatory variables  Est.  Std .err.  Est.  Std .err. 
ln gross profits
a   0.227***  0.068   0.315***  0.085 
ln real capital investments   0.203**  0.086   0.071  0.112 
ln # employees   0.672***  0.142   0.808***  0.195 
ln share upper-secondary educ.   -  -  -0.075  0.178 
ln share post-secondary educ.   -  -   0.216  0.142 
Industry dummies:      
    Raw materials  -4.968*** 0.643  -5.508*** 0.937 
    Construction materials  -5.885*** 0.710  -6.419*** 1.038 
    Intermediate goods  -5.098*** 0.614  -5.520*** 0.881 
    Investment goods  -4.884*** 0.645    -5.255***  0.899 
    Consumption goods  -5.283*** 0.630    -5.822***  0.921 
  R
2 : 0.83    R
2 : 0.87   

















 a Gross profits = total invoicing – total costs, net of training. 
Training expenditures, gross profits and real capital investments are all in millions of SEK. 
*, **, and *** denote significant at 10, 5, and 1 %,  respectively. 
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To what extent are the results in Table 1a-b sensitive to the omission of 
observations for which gross profits are zero or negative while training 
expenditures are positive? One way to shed light on this issue is to change the 
regressions very slightly, by substituting gross profits for ln gross profits. 
Given this change in the specification, the regressions can be rerun on i) the 
same companies as in Table 1a-b and ii) an extended set of observations, 
including companies that reported zero or negative profits. In these regressions, 
the coefficients for gross profits are as easily interpreted as when gross profits 
are in logarithms. This is not important here, however. The interesting question 
is whether the coefficient estimates obtained under i) and ii) are different. We 
have tested this on the number (1) regressions, i.e. those for which the 
explanatory variables are the same in both 1996 and 2000. 
For both 1996 and 2000 the estimates obtained under i) and ii) are very 
close, the differences are not anywhere near significant. Moreover, neither of 
the estimates for 1996 are significantly differ from any of the two estimates for 
2000.
25 We thus conclude that the fact that observations with zero or negative 
profits are excluded from the regressions reported in Table 1a-b has not 
affected our results.  
To sum up: we have now studied in several different ways how training in 
larger industrial companies’ varies over the business cycle. Training has been 
related to two different business-cycle indicators, capacity usage, and profits.  
And each of these two relations were investigated by means of alternative 
methods.  Without exception, we find that training has varied pro-cyclically 
rather than counter-cyclically. 
 With respect to the discussion of tax allocation funds in section 2.3, these 
results are consistent with our conjecture that tax allocation funds only to a 
limited extent have been used for training purposes. Had the funds really been 
instrumental in alleviating the adverse effects generated by the accounting 
standards we would have expected to see more of a counter-cyclical training 
pattern. 
Unfortunately, lack of data prevents us from examining whether a similar 
pro-cyclical pattern for training prevails also in other sectors than 
manufacturing, i.e. in the private and public service sectors. However, it will be 
shown below that the manufacturing sector does not differ very much from 
                                                      
25 The results are available on request. 
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can but conjecture that this is true with respect to the timing of training, too. 
 
4  The volume of employer-sponsored 
training 
Structural changes and rapid technological developments force training needs 
to increase over time. One manifestation of this is the by now general adoption 
of the concept of life-long learning, meaning that adults must continuously add 
to and update the basic knowledge they acquired in the regular education 
system. The economics literature also contains much evidence on the 
importance of workers’ skills for successful implementation of new tech-
nologies; see, e.g., Piore (1968), Mincer (1991) and Gunnarsson et al. (2001). 
The amount of training undertaken by a firm depends on the number of 
participants and on the length of the training sessions.  Figure 6a and Figure 6b 
illustrate these two dimensions, which are based on statistics from Statistics 
Sweden. The data are reported for selected sectors and for the entire economy 
(all sectors). 
Figure 6a. Proportion of employees who participated in employer-
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Figure 6a shows that for the entire economy, the number of participants has 
remained rather stable at about 40 percent since the mid-1990s.  In the sectors 
studied, the proportion of employees who participated in some type of training 
has not exceeded 50 percent since the mid-1990s.  In the care-providing sector 
(medical care, health care, child care, and care for the elderly) and the finance 
sector, participation reached 50 percent in the late 1990s but became somewhat 
lower in the early 2000s. The finance sector is the only sector showing an 
increase in participation during the period; it increased from about 40 percent 
in the mid-1990s to 45-50 percent in the second half of 1998.  
Figure 6b shows that the average number of training days per training 
participant declined in all sectors except finance, which during the late 1990s 
experienced an upswing that was followed by a downswing to the mid-1990’s 
level. The reductions in the care providing and manufacturing sectors are quite 
notable. For the entire economy, the number of training days was reduced by 
about one day during the period – from almost 6.5 days in the mid-1990s to 
about 5.5 days in the early 2000s (see the dashed line in the diagram).  
In summary, participation remained rather constant, while the number of 
training days was somewhat lower. Constant or slightly reduced training is not 
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during the 1990s. 
It might be objected that data on participation levels and number of training 
days do not account for changes in quality of training.  It is conceivable that, 
over time, employers could have increased training effectiveness by investing 
larger resources per training day. To analyse this possibility, we need data 
about training costs, by firm. Official statistics do not provide such data for the 
period 1995-2000. However, for large manufacturing firms, training costs are 
available in the aforementioned Plan survey. 
Figure 7 shows how much the companies queried in the Plan survey spent 
on training in relation to their total wage costs. The figure covers 1996 and 
2000, that is, the start and end of the period reported in Figures 6a and 6b. We 
see that during both years, the vast majority of the companies spent at most 2 
percent of their total salary costs on training. Furthermore, the proportion of 
companies that spent that modestly, increased from about 65 percent in 1996 to 
more than 75 percent in 2000. Thus, also when we look at costs, we find that, if 
anything, the amount of training has gone down over time. 
  
Figure 7. Distribution of (larger) companies over training expenditures
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In this section we outline two proposals that can change the time profile of 
employer-sponsored training, so as to make it more counter-cyclical, and, at the 
same time, increase the amount of training conducted. The proposals focus on 
the income and cash flow restrictions facing the firm, because these constraints 
can be affected by political decisions.     
We believe that it is desirable to influence both cash flow and income 
restrictions. As mentioned earlier, training expenditures must be financed with 
internally generated cash. The cash-flow restriction is of central importance 
because if cash is unavailable to finance training, then training will not occur, 
even if the profit margin allows for it. 
The two proposals do not impose any constraints on the existing 
possibilities to conduct employer-sponsored training. The intention is to make 
suggestions which allow the firms to do what they do today plus somewhat 
more. The additional possibilities are created by facilitating the undertaking of 
larger training programs during economic downturns. 
The proposals are thus explicitly aimed at affect the timing of employer-
sponsored training. However, they will also affect the volume of training, for 
two reasons. First, the increased flexibility gained by the firm with respect to 
the timing decision will by itself have a positive affect on the amount of 
training. Secondly, the fact that this increased flexibility stems from increased 
opportunities to conduct training when the opportunity cost for doing so is 
lowest has an additional positive effect – a price effect – on the volume of 
training. Of course, alleviation of firms’ cash-flow constraints strengthens these 
tendencies even further.  
The following subsections discuss the two different proposals. The first 
addresses the discrepancy between the Annual Accounts Act and its applica-
tion. The second proposal is inspired by the tax allocation funds. Both propos-
als contain a component that affects the cash-flow restriction. Our proposals 
being mere sketches, we do not take a stand on the technical realisation and the 
numerical values of the different policy parameters. It should also be added that 
the proposed measures to ease the income and cash flow restrictions need not 
be implemented together – they can also be carried out separately.  
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training expenditures 
A simple way to ease the firm’s income restriction is to change the accounting 
standards for training expenditures so that the standards are adapted to the 
Annual Accounts Act and its intentions. This measure creates extra spending 
opportunities by lowering costs during the year in which the training expendi-
tures are made. It does so by treating training expenditures as investments. 
During the year in which the training is carried out only a portion of the 
expenditures, the depreciation, affects the firm’s costs. This increases the 
possibilities for the firm to make larger training expenditures during recessions, 
when extra spending opportunities are otherwise reduced. In return, training 
expenditures will affect income over several years, through future depre-
ciations. 
The cash-flow restriction can be eased if payroll taxes are reduced in 
connection with the company’s training investment. The simplest possible 
variant is to let the reduction in the payroll taxes be proportional to the training 
expenditures. This measure facilitates the financing of training expenditures, 
particularly during recessions when cash flow is often strained.  Using payroll 
taxes for this purpose can be motivated in at least two ways. 
First, the largest training-related cost is probably the cost for lost 
production. Total salary costs dominate these costs. To ease the expenditure 
burden, it is therefore natural to use instruments that affect salary costs. 
Second, payroll tax reductions are used to stimulate employers to contribute 
to the so called individual learning accounts (ILA), aimed at increasing training 
at the individual level. Such accounts have been tried in the UK and currently 
are being discussed in Sweden. A reduction in payroll taxes in connection with 
firm training expenditures can be justified on the ground that it would help 
avoid asymmetrical treatment of employers’ expenditures on firm training and 
on ILAs.
26  
 In principle, this proposal is simple and straightforward.  It is also has the 
advantage that it makes the Annual Accounts Act and the accounting standards 
more consistent with one another. 
                                                      
26 Asymmetrical treatment of employers’ expenditures on training expenditures and contributions 
to ILAs increases the risk for employers replacing part of their own training activities with 
training acquired through the ILAs.  See Mellander and  Savvidou (2001) and Ericsson (2002) 
for discussions of this displacement problem. 
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obvious that the standard-setting organisations can be forced to change their 
standards – especially not private organisations like the Financial Accounting 
Standards Council in Sweden. The proposed change also works against 
ongoing international harmonisation of accounting pursued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). By so doing, it is bound to meet with 
protests from the domestic standard-setting organization which often perceive 
as one of their primary tasks to follow international guidelines. Finally, certain 
administrative support is needed to deal with the suggested reduction in payroll 
taxes. Companies will have to prove to the tax authorities that the expenditures 
on which they base their tax reductions really are intended for training.   
To get an idea of what companies would think about this type of proposal, 




Figur 8: “If the possibilities to capitalize training expenditures were 
              improved, how would this effect the scope of your firm's
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27 In the question we indicated that we meant that it would be easier to take up training 
expenditures on the balance sheet and write them off over several years. We did not, however, 
consider the cash-flow restriction in our question, nor did we explicitly allow for the possibility 
that the proposed measure can affect the timing of training. Indirectly, however, we left open the 
possibility of a change in the time profile.  As should be clear from the above discussion, if 
increased possibilities to capitalise training expenditure do increase the amount of training, then a 
large part of this increase will probably to come about through a change in the timing of training.   
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the companies’ responses put them under no obligations.  However, with this in 
mind, a remarkably small proportion of companies said that their training 
expenditures would increase. Perhaps one explanation for the low proportion is 
that companies anticipate some of the problems that we have just noted.  
 
5.2   Proposal 2: Implement personnel training funds 
(PTFs) 
This proposal also mitigates the income restriction by increasing the spending 
opportunities during the year that the training is implemented. It does so 
without changing the current status of training expenditures, however. The 
entire training expenditure is still to be written off immediately.  
The extra spending opportunities are created through the tax system, rather 
than through the accounting system, as is the case in Proposal 1. Companies 
can set aside a portion of their income in a personnel training fund (PTF) 
during years with good income. During years with less income (economic 
downturns), companies can draw on the PTF to create extra spending oppor-
tunities if, in the same year, the company implements training that costs at least 
as much as is being drawn from the fund. Training costs will thus be totally or 
partially neutralised (in terms of income) via the PTF. Like the first proposal, 
this proposal can be complemented by a a reduction in pay-roll taxes, in order 
to ease the firm’s cash-flow constraint. 
As has been indicated in both the theoretical and the empirical discussion, 
existing general-purpose tax allocation funds are probably not used for training 
purposes to a very large extent; other, less risky, uses are likely to be con-
sidered first.  To set up a fund specifically for training purposes is a way to 
indirectly make training expenditures a higher priority.  
Companies support the idea that there is a need for a special tax allocation 
fund for training; see Figure 9 in which we report responses to another 
hypothetical question in the Plan survey 2001.
28 
                                                      
28 The qualifications made with respect to Figure 8 apply to Figure 9, as well; see footnote 27. 
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Figure 9 “Assume that it would be possible to annually set aside 
               nontaxable income for special personnel training
               funds (compare tax allocation funds). 
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Half of the companies said that their training expenditures would be affected 
positively if special training funds were established. This must be considered as 
a high proportion. Of course, we have to remember that, the companies did not 
commit to anything. However, had the companies’ responses been motivated 
by purely tactical reasons, we would have expected an even higher proportion 
indicating positive effects. This is because the way in which the question is 
formulated means that companies are offered an opportunity to move company 
tax payments forward, without having to refrain from something else in return. 
Compared to the first proposal, this proposal is easier to implement – all that 
is needed is a change in the tax system.  Because the tax allocation funds are 
used as a model, it is also easy to design the PTF. Implementation of this 
proposal is also simplified when it comes to the cash-flow restriction because 
no extra evidence (documentation) is needed for the tax authorities. The 
evidence required to prove that the reduction really applies to training must 
have been prepared earlier, in order to use the PTF. 
 
6 Conclusions 
Present accounting standards do not allow firm training expenditures to be 
treated like investments. And human capital formation, of which employer-
sponsored training constitutes an example, does not create its own collateral, 
unlike investments in real capital. Our theoretical analysis of how these 
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to the first, training will tend vary pro-cyclically rather than counter-cyclically, 
despite the fact that the opportunity cost of employer-sponsored training is 
highest during boom periods and lowest during economic downturns. 
According to the second, more vague, implication the amount of training will 
be “too low”, relative to training needs. 
Both of the empirical implications were supported by empirical data for 
Sweden. Training occurs more frequently during booms than during recessions, 
i.e., the pattern is the reverse of what is desirable from a stabilisation policy 
perspective. This result is not sensitive to the choice of business cycle 
indicators. And we did not see any signs indicating that the amount of training 
increased during the second half of the 1990s, despite increased need for 
continuing education and life-long learning. Whether we measured training in 
terms of time spent or in terms of outlays had no effect on this finding. 
We formulated two general proposals that should make training more 
counter-cyclical and increase the amounted of training conducted. 
The first proposal is to adapt the accounting standards to the Annual 
Accounts Act (AAA). Unlike the accounting standards, the AAA gives 
companies opportunities to capitalise training expenditures and strongly 
recommends that these opportunities are used when the effects of the training 
extend over more than one year.  This proposal reduces barriers associated with 
companies’ income statements when it comes to training implementation 
during recessions. To also mitigate the limitation caused by strained cash flow 
during economic downturns, we propose that when the training investment is 
made the company receives a reduction in payroll taxes, proportional to the 
size of the investment.     
The second proposal does not affect current accounting practices; the entire 
training expenditure will still be taken up as a cost during the year that expen-
ditures are incurred.   Instead, extra spending opportunities are created via the 
tax system, by implementation of a special personnel training funds (PTF). The 
design of the PTF is analogous to the existing tax allocation fund, i.e. 
companies can set aside a proportion of their income in the fund during good 
years.  The company can then draw upon its PTF during economic downturns, 
thereby creating extra spending opportunities, provided that the redrawal is 
used for training purposes. This proviso is what distinguishes PTFs from 
traditional tax allocation funds. Relative to the existing general-purpose tax 
allocation funds, establishment of the PTF supports training expenditures 
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comes to extra spending opportunities, which is the case with the current tax 
allocation funds. The PTF can also be combined with a complementary 
reduction in payroll taxes to ease the firms’ cash-flow constraint. 
Comparing the two proposals, we conclude that the second is preferable 
over the first. The second proposal is easier to manage. It requires a change in 
tax legislation, and the change is simple because the PTF essentially builds on 
existing tax allocation funds. While the first proposal certainly is easy to 
implement in a technical sense it will be associated with considerable practical 
problems. The main reason is that the national and international organisation 
that are responsible for formulating the accounting standards are quite 
independent and cannot easily be forced to change their recommendations. 
The second proposal might lead to a somewhat heavier administrative 
burden, as it requires monitoring to ensure that withdrawals from the PTF 
correspond to at least equally large training expenditures. However, if a system 
with payroll tax reductions is also enacted then the training expenditures have 
to be verified by the tax authorities anyhow. 
The companies themselves seem to perceive the second proposal as more 
interesting. We should emphasise, however, that the questions used to uncover 
the companies’ viewpoints on the two proposals are purely hypothetical and in 
no way put obligations on the companies. This of course limits the reliability of 
the responses.  But because this applies to both questions, the information that 
reveals the companies’ relative evaluation of the proposals will still be of 
value.  From a purely economic viewpoint, it is not strange that the companies 
prefer the PTF proposal – rather than a change to the accounting standards – 
because the PTF would be advantageous from a tax perspective.  
Finally, it is important to emphasise that the changes we propose are not just 
positive for companies.  To reduce the volatility in employment over the busi-
ness cycle and to increase the amount of training is particularly important for 
the employees. 
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